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Mark Bevir in his book, Democratic Governance, has highlighted, a number of key issues facing those of us who want to understand the state and its role in governing.  Not only has the role of the state changed significantly in the last thirty years but those changes need to be understood in terms of the implications for the nature of the state’s interaction with society and the ways in which the state exercises power within a democratic context.    Perhaps what Bevir highlights most is how the conceptions of the state amongst elites is being challenged both by changes in the form of government but more importantly by changes in the nature of knowledge and how citizens understand their relationship to the state.  What Bevir illustrates is that the modern state is tied both to particular conceptions of democracy and knowledge and both these conceptions reinforce elite rule by limiting democracy to representative forms and investing considerable authority in particular forms of expertise.  Bevir’s originality lies in his attempt to highlight the relationship between ideas and state forms and thereby to reflect on how different conceptions within social science have influenced the form and nature of the processes of governing.  He warns of the danger of particular modes of thinking to the processes of democratic governance.





In his book Bevir delineates a field of modernist social science and in doing so draws an implicit link between the enlightenment project and the development of the modern state.  This is a plausible and realistic link to make considering the ways in which the ability to categorise and measure has enabled the development of highly bureaucratic forms of government (see Scott 1998).  The book also makes a number of strong claims in terms of the nature of social science (pp.3-4) ‘social science can offer us only stories about how people have acted and guesses about how they might act’.  Bevir sees social science as based on a modernism that attempted to measure and categorise and to find causal processes.  Consequently knowledge was linked to social progress.  Therefore, politicians did not need to include citizens in the process of decision making on two grounds:  first, only experts had the knowledge on which to make decisions in a rational way and second, politicians were concerned with knowledge informed progress and so could be trusted to make decisions that were in the public interest.  Politicians had to be held to account for what they did but they did not need to allow citizens (or rather subjects) to participate in the process.  The conception of policy making was deeply embedded in the British political system not least through the notion of the Westminster model which sees voters choosing a ‘strong’ government empowered to make decisions in the public interest.  Accountability was retrospective.  There was an explicitly stated principle that ‘Whitehall knows best’.  As Douglas Jay (1937)  said in his book The Socialist Case: ‘in the case of nutrition and health, just as in the case of education, the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better what is good for people than the people know themselves.’  Jay’s often misreprented view succinctly encapsulates what can be referred to as the dominant tradition in British politics built on the precepts of writers such as Dicey (1915) and Jennings (1966) who maintained that politics should be limited to those elites who had the knowledge to make policy.
Such conceptions of the policy process were intermeshed with institutional frameworks of politics based around a parliamentary system where power was highly concentrated in Government Departments and Cabinet and practices such as Ministerial accountability reinforced the idea that the apex of the political process was the Cabinet Minister who made decisions.  Hence the link that Bevir makes between the British political tradition, the process of governing and the nature of democracy seems strong.  Nevertheless, I would argue that Bevir’s approach in some senses overdramatizes the links and ironically despite his opposition to modernist notions of causality and grand narrative creates a stronger and simpler connection between ideas and action than is the case in reality.    He in effect simplifies social science and the nature of governance. 





Bevir makes a strong claim about the nature of what he sees as modernist social science and the impact that it has had on the development of the processes of governing.   One problem here is that it to some degree exaggerates the coherence of social science.  Whilst clearly a number of social scientists strongly adopted what could be called modernist social science with its limited conception of rationality, many social scientists cannot be easily classified in this way.  For example even if we take two main stream US giants of public administration, it is clear that there work does not easily fit the modernist camp.  Aaron Wildavsky’s work on the UK Treasury (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974)  or on risk and safety (Wildavsky 1988) and Lindblom’s (1959,  1979) work on policy making are highly influential critiques of rational conceptions of policy making; likewise Allison’s analysis of the Cuban missile crisis illustrates the difficulties of applying rationality to policy making.   It is difficult to accept Bevir’s easy elision between a modernist body of academic thoughts and the nature of the governing process.  Indeed, both academic approaches and the nature of governing are more variegated than Bevir allows.
	It is undoubtedly the case that from the 1970s onwards, governments found it difficult to reconcile the rising expectations of the electorate with the policy frames offered by economic restructuring (King, 1975; Offe, 1984).  Consequently a crude economic rationality which seemed both to offer an analysis and a solution to the problems of postwar political economy had a growing influence on policy makers.  There is a narrative whereby the ideas of Hayek, which were marginalized during the historically short period of social democratic dominance that followed the Second World War, were taken up by politicians, think tanks and academics and influenced policy makers in the 1980s looking to solve the problems of big government.  The point for Bevir is that interpretative theory can help us understand how these ‘forms of social science not only analyse the world but also come to constitute it’ (p.65).  Indeed as Andrew Hindmoor (2006, p.95) suggests, ‘Public choice has modified the way “modern man views government”’.  There is little doubt that conceptions of governing are now strongly influenced by the new right prescriptions.  Indeed, the World Bank has inserted new public management into its conditions for developing countries wanting loans.  However, what is clear is that this sort of neo-liberalism has been influential where governments have wanted it to be so.  Undoubtedly, as Bevir would recognize, politicians have drawn on these ideas to legitimize their actions but actually the relationship between the ideas and the actions is not clear. Consequently, there is a danger in this approach of over emphasizing the influence of ideas and modernist social science.  Indeed it is arguable that the most modernist of approaches to policy making - ‘evidence based policy’ -actually has little affect because politicians are not particularly concerned with evidence other than when it confirms their pre-existing beliefs. 
Hence, I would argue that the nature of social science is more contested than Bevir allows – not all non-interpretativists can be classified as modernists in the Bevir narrow sense.    Bevir is creating binary divide in approaches to social science and labelling all non-interpretivists as modernist empiricists when there are many shades of grey (See Marsh, 2008 & Goodwin and Grix, 2011). Moreover, the influence of these ideas is more complex than Bevir allows.  Indeed, Bevir pays insufficient attention to (and this is true of his work with Rhodes (Bever and Rhodes, 2006)  the nature of politics and of power (Smith 2008).  Many of the contestations within the policy process occur not around ideas in the sense of particular traditions but about battles of resources, legitimacy and capacities.   In other words, what can be done by institutions whilst maintaining sufficient support politically?  This is a battle of politics rather than a battle of traditions.  Traditions are undoubtedly used to legitimize certain actions but their role in the outcomes is almost completely contingent.  In other words, to suggest that ‘rational choice theory (inspiring neoliberals) and the new institutionalism (inspiring a reformed social democracy) have had an impact on the new governance…’ (p.64) is overegging the pudding.  Undoubtedly there is a strong relationship between rational choice theory and neo-liberalism but the nature of that relationship in terms of policy outcome is contingent on a whole series of events, institutions and choices.  The relationship between new insitutionalism and social democracy is contestable (a point which Bevir acknowledges later p.119).  Indeed, chapter 9 develops a complex narrative (and one open to challenge) in order to link institutionalism with Labour’s commitment to joined up government.  Again, Bevir takes too much notice of what politicians may have said about their actions rather than what happened.  Bevir sees the Labour Government taking on board notions of networks to develop their post-Keynesian welfare state.  I would argue that what actually concerned New Labour’s thinking was a pragmatism based on ensuring the new Government would not fail as others had in the past.  In practice then, their governance statecraft could be aligned  much closer to the traditional Labour belief in big government and high public expenditure than any conception of new institutionalism.  What drove Labour was politics and not ideas This is not to say ideas were not there, they clearly were, but that what those ideas were and how the impact was more complex than Bevir allows (see Blunkett and Richards, 2011).


SIMPLIFYING THE NATURE OF THE STATE AND FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

Bevir emphasizes the role of ideas because he pays insufficient attention to the complex nature of the state and the way its institutions structure choices and outcomes.  Much of the debate about governance is oversimplified because as Bevir says, ‘governance contrasts with the persistence of the state as largely monolithic’ (p.90).  Yet as Bevir acknowledges, governance is not about the end of the state and that, like Jessop (2004), non-state actors often operate in the shadow of hierarchy. What this illustrates is that what we are seeing is not a shift from government to governance but actually a complex process of state formation and reformation that varies across time, space and policy sector.  Again, Bevir is led into this simplification by his general dismissal of modernist social science.  Even the most grand of the modernist state analysts, Michael Mann (1986), demonstrates the complexity of the state with its shifting boundaries, complex networks and constantly varying capacities.  In other words, the difference between governance and government are much less stark than is often suggested.  As Migdal (2001) points out states are fuzzy and messy organizations which lack clear boundaries.  At the same time Cohen (2003, p.28) emphasizes the resilience of the state and warns ‘the erosion of sovereignty is not a general and necessarily irreversible phenomena’.  So despite the new ideas invoked in policy debates, some states are losing capacity and others are gaining it.  Some are losing capacity in some areas whilst increasing it in others.  What is almost a universal truth is that states throughout the world, despite the influence of neo-liberalism, are getting larger in terms of expenditure.  Whilst states in a small part of the developed West are attempting to divest certain functions, it is still the case that the levels of expenditure, until the 2008 economic crisis, have been increasing.  At the same time, many states outside the West are attempting to develop the capacities of the Modern developed state.  The shift from government to governance is a contested idea that needs empirical investigation.  Network government is not new.  As Mann highlighted, for states to be able to implement policy without relying on force, they need to build up networks in civil society that developed infrastructural power. Consequently, these networks mean that the boundaries of the state have never been fixed (Migdal, 2001).
	Bevir talks of a ‘neo-liberal narrative’ emerging which subsequently influenced patterns of state reform.  I would suggest that in many cases this neo-liberal narrative was weak and contested and that its impact was often diluted by existing institutional arrangements (see Pierson 1995).  Ironically, this is the very point that Bevir makes in his case study of the police.  He suggests that the police resist neoliberal reforms because ‘serving officers necessarily adapt and modify the reforms’ (p.238).  This account. unless it is appealing to a purely agency based explanation, is similar to sociological institutionalism, whereby norms and values shape actions and so create a mechanism for resisting the imposition of reforms.  If we extrapolate the impact of institutional norms and values to states, we can start to understand why states have not shrunk despite the apparent dominance of neo-liberal ideas. Embedded interests, sets of norms and values and political expediency has resulted in significant resistance to neoliberalism and therefore the way ideas and beliefs shape outcomes cannot be understood without understanding the structures within which they operate.   Neoliberalism has frequently been resisted or subverted because of a combination of institutions and politics.  Of course, the problem that both Bevir and institutional accounts are left with is why are some reforms pushed through and others resisted?
	The key point is that it is difficult to understand the state and how it has changed without understanding its institutional forms and capacities.  An approach that focuses largely on ideas and traditions omits sufficient analysis of the complex forms states take and the way those institutional patterns resist and shape the impact that ideas and policies have on outcomes.  Neo-liberal politicians may wish to reduce welfare dependency but if they cannot reduce the numbers on welfare this is very difficult to achieve.  Welfare budgets go up as politicians desire them to go down.  This is not a consequence of the ability of agents to draw on belief systems but the institutional structures of labour markets and welfare states.  Any account of changing patterns of governance needs to examine the institutional context as well as the changing nature of beliefs.
   	Bevir makes a strong claim in his book that ‘modernist social science and the broader culture associated with it have inspired changes in the state that have weakened democracy’ (p.9).  This argument is difficult to sustain.  As I outlined above, the approach simplifies the nature of social science and exaggerates its impact.  The account of the book is that lineal shifts in social science have led to lineal shifts in forms of governance and the nature of democracy.  However, as I have suggested the nature of governance has always been complex and indeed, when focusing on the British state, the nature of democracy has always been limited.  This account pays insufficient attention to the complexity of the state, the nature of institutions and the impact of politics.  Politicians have clearly used certain ideas to legitimise their behaviour but it is far from clear that ideas developed in academia and think tanks have had a tangible impact on outcomes.  Consequently when looking at the changes that have occurred to the  processes of governing in terms of either the more particular nature of the Westminster model or the more general changes to the state in later modernism it is important to examine both how institutions and conceptions of power affect the state.


THE STATE AFTER MODERNISM: REFORMING THE WESTMINSTER MODEL

Bevir outlines new forms of governance developing as a response to particular ideas about the state and public policy.  I would argue that what is striking about the British state in particular is the resilience of traditional institutional forms despite almost 30 years of attempts to reform the state.  The British state can also be seen as part of a wider process where we have not seen a distinct shift from government to governance, but instead the state adapting the way in which it exercises power in response to new social, political and institutional conditions (Richards and Smith, 2010).  
	Bevir correctly identifies the British state as being defined by the Westminster model emphasising Parliamentary sovereignty, a hierarchical conception of power with Ministers and the Prime Minister at the apex and a representative form of democracy where forms of accountability actually reinforce the notion that power is concentrated in the hands of Minister (Judge, 1993).  Many commentators have suggested that the Westminster model has been undermined by a series of public management and constitutional reforms.  However the process is much more complex than this.  First, it is important to remember that the Westminster model was never an  empirical reality, but instead an ideal and a ‘legitimising discourse’ (Merelman, 2003).  It enabled politicians to use the institutions of British government in a way that concentrates power in the centre of government and then legitimises action through the Westminster conceptions of representative democracy and accountability (it is worth pointed out that these limited conceptions of democracy are essentially pre-modern forms of representation created before universal suffrage or the existence of mass political parties and so to see a decline in British democracy as linked to recent reforms is not empirically correct).
What is interesting about the British process of government is how deeply embedded certain institutions have become within the polity.  For example, recent governments in Britain, , have criticised the idea of the strong state and pressed for a considerable range of reform, but many of the traditional institutions of British government remain in place.  What we see with both the Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair administrations is a similar paradox; both were committed to a fundamental reform of the British political system, yet each failed to make fundamental changes partly because they were faced by the stickiness of institutions and the need to retain the power resources provided by the Westminster system.  In other words, governments in Britain have been faced by the paradox of wanting to reform the state in the network pattern outlined by Bevir but needing to retain the power provided by the existing institutional arrangements.  
The last Labour government (1997-2010) undertook a series of  reforms at the centre which led to the emergence of a complex mix of governance structures - hierarchies, networks and markets in the wider state apparatus, alongside differing modes of public good delivery – command, incentives and partnerships (Considine and Lewis, 2003). This in turn rendered a series of contradictions in its governing statecraft.  Most notably, a shift away from hierarchical forms of state organisation through the development of e-government, pluralistic forms of service delivery, delegation of management and the use of a range of public/private, local/national providers, but concomitantly, a strengthening of the centre, both in institutional-unit building terms and policy agendas derived from the top and delivered by a plurality of public service delivery agents operating within a culture of prescribed targets and auditing. Cumulatively, this contradiction characterised a dilemma that the Labour Government never effectively resolved – how to meet the ever more disparate needs of an increasingly complex and diverse society, what it at times referred to as breaking the ‘one-size fits all’ mentality within public services, while at the same time, attempting to maintain its status as the most powerful actor in an increasingly fragmented policy-making arena.    Indeed a rhetorical commitment to a small state and greater decentralisation was contradicted by a clear commitment to considerable mechanisms of state intervention.
From this perspective Bevir is half right.  The Labour government was influenced by a range of ideas including neo-liberalism which had some impact on how policies and the state were conceived.  However, the practise was mediated in  significant ways by the institutional arrangements.  Of course, for Bevir this could be accounted for in terms of politicians and officials appealing to different traditions.  However, I would argue that it is not beliefs on their own that have affected the nature of state reforms but the structure of government and calculations of political actors; and  the ways in which institutions shape and filter ideas (Jessop, 2008).  Indeed, if we are to understand how government works we need to look at the complex relationships between ideas, institutions and actions.  This approach leads to more differentiated understanding of the state after Modernism than Bevir allows.


THE STATE AFTER MODERNISM: NEW FORMS OF STATE POWER

What is interesting about Bevir’s account is that despite the rejection of modernist narratives, opposition to essentialism and a desire to decentre our understanding of politics and government, he provides a relatively lineal account of a shift from government to governance.  He suggests that we must not ‘exaggerate the decline of the state’ but ‘we must not ignore it’.  I would like to suggest that whilst the modern state has faced a series of crises related to the economy, legitimacy, capacity and changing global relations, the issue of whether states after modernism have declined is an empirical question.  Indeed, I would make three points.  First, following Stones (1996) the state after modernism is a state build on modernist foundations and consequently, retains many of the perhaps hubristic and progressive goals of the postwar developed states and their traditional institutional forms (such as bureaucracy).  Second, state power and forms and organisation come and go and actually vary from sector to sector so we cannot see the state as a unified organisation that  loses or gains power in a zero-sum fashion, but instead the impact of the state and its ‘power’ will vary.  Third, whilst many have actually suggested that the power of the state has declined, actually what we have seen in  recent years is the development of new ‘technologies of power’ whereby states have attempted to develop new capacities to supplement the less effective ones of the modern state (Smith 2009).   
	From this perspective, the state after modernism is not about a shift from government to governance but the development of more complex processes of state capacity building.  Modern states relied heavily, but not exclusively, on bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy and force for achieving specific outcomes.  Bureaucracy underpinned by legitimacy was an important mechanism for states to establish social and economic interventions in the post-war period.  Of course, in most states both democratic and non-democratic legitimate bureaucracy was underpinned by the potential recourse to force.   
Whilst the modern state was built on the bureaucratic triad, the pastmodern (rather than postmodern) (Stones, 1996) state has built a new set of mechanisms on the modernist foundation.  In other words, these mechanisms supplement rather than replace the traditional forms of state power.  States cannot escape from the Hobbesian problem of order.  For the state to survive, state actors have to ensure order within their territory. Consequently, whatever the impact of globalization and neo-liberalism, states will try to control their populations.  The banking crisis of 2008 starkly illustrates the imperative for (or will of) states to intervene when the economic order is threatened.  What we have seen in recent years has been the development of new and powerful mechanisms of control by states. These mechanisms have focussed on surveillance, risk, rationality and regulation.  As with the traditional triad, these conceptions are strongly interlinked.
	Surveillance has always been a core element of the modern state.  Modern states exist on the basis of being able to observe their populations.  However, the development of digital technologies has resulted in a step change in the ways in which data is collected and stored.  It permits the focus on individual data, the storing of considerable amounts of data and the ability to connect this data together.  As a result citizens are watched in ways that are qualitatively and quantitatively different, and this has changed the relationship between the individual and the state.  Surveillance has become a mechanism of maintaining order by watching what people do (it is not a posthoc reconstruction) and increasingly predicting how people will behave.  Consequently, surveillance data can be linked to risk analysis to model how individuals could behave in the future and thus what incentives and regulations should be put in place to prevent deviant activities.  States are not focussing only on collective behaviours – as they did in the past – but on individual behaviour.  Increasingly, social problems are not seen as having structural causes but as being the consequence of individual behaviour and choices.  It is interesting to note the way in which individualistic ontologies have permeated collectivist ideologies such as social democracy and traditional conservatisms.  This has led states to try to change the behaviour of individuals.  The focus on rational choice has led to a belief that the focus of state intervention is on the individual.  
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